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Use of migration tax as an instrument for financing development expenditure in poorer 
countries has received renewed attention recently and is evolving as an important subject of 
research in development economics. This paper discusses a related issue where the revenue 
collected by taxing skilled and unskilled migrants moving from poor to rich countries can help 
raising the level of human capital in the source country. The paper provides an unifying analysis 
for two distinct strands of literature—one claims that lack of restriction on skill migration 
promotes human capital formation and the other, the more conventional one, argues for greater 
restriction against negative impact of brain drain. Considering that both human capital 
formation and migration involve risk, we then explore a connection between imposition of 
migration tax, human capital formation and risk aversion. For a country with low level of 
human capital to start with, we establish that a proportionally higher migration tax imposed on 
the  unskilled migrants considerably raises the average level of human capital for all non-
migrants. The disincentive effect of the migration tax and its use as educational subsidy shifts 
the critical relative risk aversion among the non-migrants in favour of acquiring more human 
capital. The proposed migration tax pattern also raises the average income level of all 
individuals and only conditionally for the non-migrants. 
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1 Introduction 
The research on international mobility of the skilled and the unskilled labour has 
proliferated along a wide range of issues and has used an equally large number of 
methodologies. One such issue, which received enthusiastic attention lately, is that of 
international migration of labour and human capital formation in the source country.1 
Notably, Stark et al. (1997, 1998), Stark and Wong (2001) have shown in a number of 
papers that a positive probability of migration to a rich country raises the average skill 
level in the poor origin country. It essentially deals with a situation where the residents 
of the origin country receive higher inducement to acquire human capital when the 
country opens up to international migration of the skilled workers. Migration 
opportunities work as a substitute for domestic tax subsidy schemes aimed at raising the 
prevailing level of human capital to a socially desirable state. Opening up to migration, 
albeit controlled, is a desirable policy according to these studies and stands in sharp 
contrast to the literature that advocates stricter skill migration controls in support of the 
age-old brain drain hypothesis. The present study is an attempt at unifying these two 
contrasting ideas.  
 
Here, we discuss an explicit link between measures towards migration controls and 
changes in the level of average human capital in poor countries. In particular, we argue 
that the imposition of ‘migration taxes’2 as an instrument of migration control can also 
improve the average level of human capital and hence the welfare level in the source 
country. The inducement to acquire human capital operates through transfer of the tax 
revenue within the source country, and simultaneously via creation of disincentives 
towards migration for certain skill types. 
 
The reason for invoking the economically and politically rather controversial issue of 
migration tax, are many. These include on the one hand, Bhagwati’s (1976, 1979, 1987) 
earlier economic and political (representation without taxation) arguments in favour of 
taxing the brain drain, and some more recent concerns on the other. Under the present 
practices in many developing countries, education even up to the graduate level is state-
sponsored and thus extremely subsidized. The majority of workers who choose to 
emigrate acquire their basic as well as technical and professional trainings under such 
free regimes. Once they emigrate permanently, the state not only loses its future 
taxpayers, but also faces possibilities of lower economic growth due to lack of skill.3 
Consequently, there has been recent resurgence of policy dialogues towards taxing the 
migrants and sharing the proceeds between the host and the destination countries.  
 
                                                 
1   See Docquier and Rapoport (2004) for a survey.  
2   Initially designed by Jagdish Bhagwati and popularly called ‘Bhagwati tax’. A flat migration tax rate 
of 1-3 per cent was first implemented for migrants from the Philippines. It raised about 23 million in 
Philippines dollars between 1973-76. The USA continually practices taxing its resident workers 
abroad and the present estimate is as high as $20 billion.   
3   According to Straubhaar and Wolburg (1998), however, taxing immigrants is only legitimate if the 
human capital acquired in the home country leads to significantly higher income in the immigration 
country relative to people with less human capital. For more on the ethics of imposing migrant taxes 
and its effects on the economy, see a collection of articles in Bhagwati and Wilson (1989).    2
Desai et al. (2004) take up the examples of India and USA as large source and host 
countries respectively, and offer a set of (for developing countries in general) direct, co-
operative or exit tax schemes with significant merits attached to each proposal. The 
migration tax (whether collected by authorities in the rich country following bilateral 
negotiations, or ‘directly’ transferred by the migrants to their home country 
government)4 as an instrument clearly differs from the more popularly discussed 
political economy issues of setting domestic income tax and/or public goods provision 
in the presence of immigration in a rich country labour market (for example, Mayr 
2007; Thum 2004).  
 
It is also well known that the emigration of very low-skilled workers (to adjacent 
countries, mostly) has often been influenced by abject poverty, racial or religious 
discrimination, fear of political persecution and similar other reasons. It is beyond the 
scope of the present paper to accommodate all such types of migrations (including, 
illegal) and therefore, we consider only those types of emigrants who migrated for 
employment based on their optimizing decisions. Such optimization, it is widely 
acknowledged, strongly reflects on the risk involved in migration and holds equally true 
for optimization leading to human capital formation.5 As a natural reaction to these 
rather pervasive phenomena, we develop a crucial interaction between risk aversion, 
human capital formation and migration as an illustration of the optimization problems 
facing the agents at different levels of decision making. In fact, the coefficient of risk 
aversion in our model accommodates and represents several factors that can potentially 
affect human capital formation and migration for workers in a poor country. The factors 
which are often known to affect decisions towards human capital formation and 
migration include innate abilities that can only be discovered with a crucial time lag, 
access to credit, access to information, family size and intra-household dependence 
pattern, prevalence of asymmetric information in the foreign country labour market, and 
etc. It is well known that all of these factors contain diverse elements of risk and that 
using a utility function with income risk can appropriately represent all individuals 
facing decision making problems on human capital formation and migration. 
 
Incidentally, a number of recent studies also discuss the relationship between migration 
(internal and international) and risk preference (for example, Conroy 2007; Jaeger et al. 
2007; Driouchi et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2003; etc.). Among these, the report by Driouchi 
et al. (2006) deserves special attention given that its purpose is almost similar to that of 
the present paper. They show that the level at which education is valued, labour 
productivity across countries and the emigration rate, all positively affect the formation 
of human capital in the presence of risk aversion in the source country.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a model on the 
relationship between migration and human capital formation in the source country. 
                                                 
4   The precise method of tax administration is outside the purview of the present paper. Detailed 
information on how such tax proposals may be implemented is found in Desai et al. (2004).  
5   Among the papers that deal with investment in human capital formation and attitude towards risk, 
Levhari and Weiss (1974: 950) offer perhaps the most revealing relationship between the two—‘The 
hypothesis that human capital is more risky need not imply that investment in human capital is 
discouraged or that the expected marginal return in human capital is higher’—in need of an 
optimization that might generate a deterministic pattern.    3
Section 3 discusses the human capital impact of migration taxes. Section 4 takes up the 
implications for income disparity among the non-migrants, and Section 5 concludes.  
2 The  model 
Let us consider an economy with a mass of unskilled workers equal to one. At some 
point of time t, the mass of workers make a decision on whether they acquire human 
capital or remain unskilled. Human capital formation involves direct costs, is not 
instantaneous and no income is earned during this phase. The wages of skilled and 
unskilled workers are set exogenously at S w  and w, respectively, with ( S w >w) and that 
within each skill category the workers are homogeneous in characteristics. We skip the t 
subscript for all such specifications. Assume further that each individual faces a 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type of von Neumann-Morgenstern indirect 
expected utility function: 
r W U
− =
1 , where W is wealth and r is the coefficient of risk 
aversion. The utility function also implies decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), 
i.e. the level of absolute risk aversion falls as more and more of wealth is acquired. 
However, the only form of wealth that these individuals have is their wage income. The 
mass of workers are distributed uniformly over the scale of risk aversion, [ ) 1 , 0 ∈ r , and 
we do not make any a priori presumption about an individual’s risk preference. 
 
We follow a standard textbook exposition in motivating the optimization exercise on 
whether human capital should or should not be acquired.6 The optimization yields a 
deterministic distribution of educational choice among the unit mass. Thus, our analysis 
begins with describing the indirect expected utility facing an unskilled individual at time 
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where, ‘ε ’ is a uniformly distributed random fluctuation ( 0 ) ( ], , [ = − ∈ ε ε E a a  
2 2) ( ε σ ε = E and ), added to the unskilled wage w, n is the number of years an unskilled 
individual works and ρ  is the discount rate, with  0 ) ( , 0 ) ( > ′ ′ < ′ r U E r U E U U  (derivations 
are provided in Appendix II). 
 
On the other hand, the discounted indirect expected utility facing the individual who 
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6   See Appendix I for details.    4
where ‘β ’ is the random fluctuation associated with skilled wage, 
0 ) ( ], , [ = − ∈ β β E b b , 
2 2) ( β σ β = E and .7 D is the direct cost of education, s is the 
number of years put in education, and (n+s) implies that skilled persons work ‘s’ years 
more than the unskilled. Again,  0 ) ( , 0 ) ( > ′ ′ < ′ r U E r U E S S , and 
[ ) 1 , 0 ) ( ) ( ∈ ∀ ′ < ′ r r U E r U E S U .  Equalizing (1) and (2) given the 
parameters D and s n b a w w S , , , , , , ρ , solves for r* as the critical relative risk aversion for 
the mass. Consequently, the individuals who are distributed in the range [0, r*] acquire 
human capital, since the discounted indirect expected utility from human capital 
formation exceeds that from remaining unskilled over this zone. The converse applies 
for those who are distributed in the range [r*, 1), where the discounted expected utility 
from remaining unskilled exceeds that from acquiring human capital. One or more 
individuals who are distributed at r* remain indifferent between the two options. In 
other words, the critical risk aversion determines the optimum level of human capital 
produced in that society at time t, such that, the total (and the average, given mass equal 
to one and that the mass is uniformly distributed over r) number of skilled workers 





r dr r f . Conversely, the number of people who remain 
unskilled is given by (1-r*). This is shown in Panel A of Figure 1. 
 
Given the initial distribution, both skilled and unskilled workers face the option of 
working at home or migrate to a rich country where the skilled and unskilled wages are 
S S w w >
*  and w w > * , respectively. Also, consider * w wS > , so that unskilled migrants do 
not find it rewarding to migrate as unskilled. Wages in the foreign country are also set 
exogenously at *) (
* w wS >  and are not sensitive to the extent of migration (migration is 
relatively small and uncorrelated across skill types). Besides, the skill level of a 
particular migrant is readily interpreted and discovered in the foreign country, i.e. 
information is symmetric. This poses a subsequent optimization problem facing the two 
categories of workers distributed uniformly over the scales of relative risk aversion, 
now related to the choice of migration, instead of human capital 
formation: [ ) [ ) 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 ∈ ∈ U S r r . For the skilled workers this implies a comparison 
between the discounted indirect expected utilities based on their pay-offs at home and 
abroad (i.e., ) ( ) (
* *
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1 * 1      (3) 
 
whereμ is the random fluctuation associated with skilled wage in the foreign country 
and distributed uniformly, 
2 2) ( 0 ) ( ], , [ μ σ μ μ μ = = − ∈ E and E m m .  S λ  is the 
‘discount factor’ (see Katz and Stark 1987) with which a skilled migrant discounts his 
                                                 
7   Dutta et al. (1999) use the British Household Panel Survey to show that income variance for the more 
educated is less than that for the rest. This is reflected in our choice of parameters later.    5
income abroad and may broadly be defined as the cost associated with migration.8 Once 
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′
< ′ r r EU r U E S S . As a control in favour 
of an unbiased comparison we hold that the magnitude of the fluctuations relative to 





= , as also the number of years a 
skilled worker remains in employment. Using equation (3) we therefore solve for 
*
S r  as 
the critical relative risk aversion among the skilled workers, and following similar logic 
as above, the group of skilled workers who are distributed in the zone [0,
*
S r ] migrate to 
the rich country and the rest distributed between [
*
S r , 1) stay home. Therefore, the actual 
number of skilled migrants is ) * (
*
S r r . The distribution is depicted in Panel B of Figure 1. 
 
It is straightforward to conjecture now that for the unskilled workers also an exactly 
same comparison with all the specifications as detailed in the previous paragraph holds 
in favour of determining the critical relative risk aversion, such that the equilibrium 
distribution of workers who migrate and those who stay is distinctly identified. Thus, 
) ( ) (
* *
U U U U w EU w EU = solves for
*
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Clearly, the economy settles for a new skilled-unskilled ratio at home
) 1 *)( 1 (








−  and 
this ratio can be same as or different from the initial distribution of skill. According to 
Driouchi et al. (2006) if the post-migration skilled-unskilled ratio exceeds the initial 
ratio at home then there is a brain gain. It is a brain drain otherwise. While such 
implications follow directly from this model as well (comparing the old and new 
skilled-unskilled ratio, brain gain results if 
* *
U S r r < ), we want to invoke the role of 
migration tax in order to obtain a more policy-sensitive and intuitively challenging 
relationship between migration, human capital formation and average income. The 
sequence of events attains the following nature. The government imposes skill specific 
taxes on those who have already migrated and redistributes the proceeds to those non-
migrant workers who remain unskilled. If it is a one time policy, it raises the skill level 
for once and do not have any further impact. If however, it continues over subsequent 
time periods two implications follow: one, the unskilled non-migrants always take into 
account the subsidy in reconsidering the utility from human capital formation, which 
can potentially alter r*; and two, all future migrants would consider the tax factor before 
                                                 
8   Mayr (2007) models cost of migration directly. Here the discount factor subsumes such costs (along 
with distance from family and culture, food habits etc.) and explicit consideration of the cost does not 
affect the direction of our results.   
9   Panels A, B and C in Figure 1 are generated by Maple 5.0 and the detailed program is available on 
request. It should be noted that the graphs and numerical results are offered as examples as against the 
near impossibility of obtaining analytical solutions algebraically and have been tested over a wide 
range of values to check for variations.      6
they migrate, which can change 
* * , U S r r  and consequently the level of subsidy. This 
conjoins migration tax, educational subsidy and human capital formation in two 
dynamic relationships that we explore next. 




        
 
 
Panel  B       Panel  C 
Note: Figure 1 generated from the following values assigned to the parameters and variables: 
6 . 0 , 9 . 0 , 3 , 05 . 0 , 54 , 11 , 05 . 0 ,
*
2 . 0
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3 Migration  tax 
Let us re-define the objective of the government at this point. It intends to raise the level 
of human capital in the economy for those who stay behind, by imposing migration 
taxes and using the revenue. The rise in the average level of human capital would imply 
an increase in the level of critical risk aversion among the mass, such that more 
unskilled workers are distributed in the range where human capital formation yields 
higher expected utility than remaining unskilled. Let  S τ  and  U τ  be the tax rates 
imposed in the destination country on the skilled and unskilled migrants respectively. 
For simplicity, assume that both identification of the migrants across skill types and the 
collection of tax are costless10 for the foreign tax authority and the tax revenue is fully 
transferred back to the country where the migrants originate. The government of the 
origin country decides to redistribute this tax revenue completely to the unskilled mass 
in the country as per unit subsidy (θ ) towards educational expenses. This is an 
exclusively tax-financed subsidy11 and therefore contingent on the budget constraint 
*) , ( r B θ  facing the government: 
 
U U S S U r r r r r r τ τ θ
* * * *) 1 ( * ) 1 ( *) 1 ( − + = − −        (5) 
 
LHS of equation (5) is the amount of the subsidy to be distributed among the unskilled 
non-migrants, against the tax revenue collected (RHS) from the distribution of migrants 
as obtained above. Also, as r* is known the value of θ  is easily calculated from (5). The 
amount of subsidy in any t+1 period depends on the flow of migrants in period t, and 
this flow of migrants in period t is a function of the tax rates prevailing at that time. The 
subsidy distributed would then affect the level of r* in period t+1. Suppose all migrants 
who migrated prior to period t are exempted from paying taxes. This provides the first 
dynamic relationship between θ  and r*. Thus, equation (5) depicts combinations of 











. Figure 2 explores 
three distinct cases that can be generated from the relationship in  ) *, ( θ r B . First, we 
consider the case of uniform migration taxes across skill types displayed as 
U S r B
τ τ θ
= *) , ( and subsequently, two other cases: 
U S r B
τ τ θ
> *) , (a n d
U S r B
τ τ θ
< *) , ( . There is 
no spillover effect of migration tax on one skill type, on the level of migration for the 
other. 
 
When educational subsidy is available the unskilled workers at home reconsider the 
utility from human capital formation. Comparing that to the utility from remaining 
unskilled potentially results in a new r* at time t+1. This characterizes the second 
dynamic relationship between θ  and r*. More specifically, the educational subsidy 
offered by the government now adds a component to the indirect expected utility 
function for human capital formation ( θ S EU ). The mass of unskilled non-migrants 
                                                 
10  In fact, in most developed countries the legal migrants are clearly known to the tax authorities often 
via references to bilateral tax treaties, and therefore imposition of a migrant-specific tax should incur 
no extra cost.  
11  See Stark and Wang (2001) for a similar treatment in favour of raising the level of human capital.     8
compares the ρ -discounted lifetime utility from human capital formation to that from 
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Given the parameter values, equation (6) offers a combination of ( * ,r θ ) that maintains 













. Figure 2 delineates  *) , ( r M θ  at two different ‘initial’ levels of r*, obtained 
by holding the value of  *) , ( r M θ at  0 = θ . The position of  *) , ( r M θ  plays a crucial role 
in determining which type of migration tax would be most effective in raising the level 
of human capital. For example, if in the pre-tax pre-subsidy regime, the level of critical 
risk aversion among the mass is rather low (due to, say, high cost of education), then the 
location of the curve may be one like  *) , ( r M θ  as in Figure 2. Then a regime of flat 
migration taxes ( U S τ τ = ) turns out to be most effective in raising the level of human 
capital in the economy. In fact, as the graphical exposition shows, 5 cents per dollar flat 
tax on the migrants can generate a subsidy of about 15 cents for the unskilled non-
migrants. Evidently, it also raises the critical relative risk aversion to a higher level than 
is obtained under the no-subsidy regime. A policy of higher migration tax on the 
unskilled workers ( U S τ τ < ) is also more effective than taxing skilled workers at a 
higher rate. These are shown by points A, P and L in Figure 2 where the ‘new’ r*  
under the flat tax regime exceeds that attained under the other two alternatives. In   
fact, a rank ordering of the impact of migration tax would be: 
U S U S U S r r r
τ τ τ τ τ τ θ θ θ
> < = > > *) , ( *) , ( *) , ( . Undoubtedly, in the first two cases, the tax 
burden on the unskilled worker is higher than in the third case. It follows that a 
regressive tax pattern generates higher levels of human capital among the unskilled non-
migrants. 
 
Alternatively, if the pre-tax pre-subsidy critical relative risk aversion is already at a high 
level as shown by the *) , ( 1 r M θ curve in Figure 2, then the rank ordering of the impact 
of migration tax changes in favour of taxing the skilled workers at a higher rate,   
albeit the flat migrant tax remains the most effective instrument: 
U S U S U S r r r
τ τ τ τ τ τ θ θ θ
< > = > > *) , ( *) , ( *) , ( ( A’, L’ and P’, respectively). There is a possible 
third option when any  *) , ( r M θ  intersects both 
U S r B
τ τ θ
> *) , (  and 
U S r B
τ τ θ
< *) , ( a t  t h e  
same point (Q in Figure 2). If the economy starts at such a level of r*, then taxing 
skilled migrants at a higher or a lower rate would provide equivalent increases in the 
level of r*. However, in all such cases the policy of imposing a flat tax across the skill 
types dominates the impact on human capital formation, implying that a higher tax 
burden on the unskilled unambiguously promotes human capital formation.   
 
   9
Figure 2: The dynamic relationships between migration tax, redistribution and human 
capital  
   
Note:  *) , ( r M θ  is generated from the following values of the parameters:  
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Let us provide some intuitive explanations for these seemingly unconventional results. 
First, consider a low level of r* to begin with. The objective of the government is to tax 
the migrants and use the revenue to subsidize education at home for those who are 
distributed in the region where discounted expected utility from acquiring human capital 
is lower than remaining unskilled. Under the circumstances, if the government taxes the 
unskilled workers at a proportionally higher rate than the skilled workers it favours 
higher human capital formation in two different ways. On the one hand, the non-migrant 
unskilled workers get the benefit of educational subsidy to acquire human capital and on 
the other, take notice of the fact that if they migrate as ‘skilled’ workers they face a 
lower tax rate. It must be noted that even the flat tax as percentage of unskilled foreign 
wage is considerably higher compared to the tax burden per unit of skilled wage abroad. 
Thus, the proportionately higher migration tax discourages unskilled workers to remain   10
unskilled and migrate as unskilled workers. In other words, a (proportionately or 
directly) higher tax on unskilled workers turns out to be both the stick and the carrot that 
the government may use to induce greater human capital formation in the country. 
 
Second, consider an economy where the level of human capital is already high (as 
shown by  *) , ( 1 r M θ  in Figure 2), and it positively biases the number of skilled 
migrants. A ceteris paribus flat tax can then generate larger tax revenue to be 
distributed as a higher per unit subsidy (point A′ in Figure 2, where the same 5 cent per 
dollar tax can now generate a per unit subsidy of about 50 cents). The incremental 
human capital formation is also more sensitive to taxing the skilled workers at a higher 
rate than the unskilled workers. Clearly, the contrasting tax patterns as one observes 
under the initial levels of low and high human capital formation may be representative 
of how countries with dissimilar emigration experiences may choose to deal with the 
imposition of migrant taxes.  
 
Proposition 1: A flat migration tax across skill types (and therefore regressive) is most 
effective in raising the level of human capital for the unskilled non-migrants under all 
cases. A higher unskilled tax relative to skilled tax is also more effective in raising the 
level of human capital if the economy starts from a low level of human capital.  
4  Implications for income levels 
Finally, let us discuss the impact of such taxes on the level of income for the non-
migrants. Define the total (and average) income level for the skilled and unskilled non-
migrants as follows: 
 
*) 1 )( 1 ( * ) 1 (
* * r r w r r w U S s − − + − = Ω         ( 7 )  
 
where, 0 , 0 ), (
* < ′ ′ < ′ = f f f r S S τ ; 0 , 0 ), (
* < ′ ′ < ′ = g g g r U U τ . These imply that as tax 
rates on the skilled and the unskilled go up independently, the level of critical risk 
aversion falls for each type. This follows directly from a post-tax comparison of the 
level of expected utilities for the skilled and the unskilled (reformulating equations 3 
and 4) solving for lower levels of 
* *
U S r and r : 
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However, following (6), 0 , 0 ), ( * > ′ ′ > ′ = k k k r θ , and  0 , 0 ), , ( < ′ ′ > ′ = l l l U S τ τ θ  in the 
post-subsidy regime. A rise in the amount of subsidy increases the level of critical risk 
aversion among the non-migrants increasingly, such that more unskilled workers are 
now distributed in the range where human capital accumulation yields greater utility. 
On the other hand, a rise in either type of migrant taxes (holding the other as constant)   11
would raise the level of subsidy.12 This allows us to observe the impact on Ω when one 
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It should be noted that the sufficient condition for increase in the average income of the 
non-migrants is the same for any ceteris paribus change in the rate of migration tax 



















. A comparison of (8) 
and (9) further implies that an increase in the tax imposed on the unskilled migrants, as 
compared to skilled migrants, would be more productive in raising the relative income, 




































 is the ratio 
of the sensitivity of unskilled migration to unskilled tax, and the sensitivity of skilled 






 is the ratio of skilled-to-unskilled 
income in the pre-migration regime.     
 
                                                 
12  This assumes that both types of migrants exist in a relatively inelastic zone, where a change in the tax 











δ . More 
generally, therefore, the effect of tax on subsidy can go either way.      12
Proposition 2: Any increase in the unskilled migration tax dominates the relative 
change in average income vis-à-vis skilled migration tax, if and only if the skilled-to-
unskilled income ratio in the pre-migration regime is strictly greater than the ratio of the 
change in unskilled migration to unskilled tax relative to the same for skilled migration. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Taxing migrants to raise the level of income for the non-migrants is a complex and 
moot proposition. Yet, in recent times the phenomenal increase in the global trends in 
labour migration predominantly originating from the developing world opens up 
questions on whether it can be a viable policy to benefit a large number of non-
migrants. One certain way in which migration helps the improvement of living 
conditions (and alleviation of poverty) in the source countries is via remittances. 
However, it is also widely acknowledged that the larger share of remittances comes 
from the relatively unskilled migrants in favour of maintaining their families at home. 
The contributions from the skilled migrants are both low and highly volatile on account 
of various reasons. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on the extent of spillovers 
such remittances, a considerable portion of which is transferred in kinds, generate for 
the larger society. Thus, migration taxes as a stable alternative may be justified on many 
such grounds (in addition to the ones already discussed in earlier studies) giving the 
government options to use a potentially large resource more efficiently. 
 
While the creation or existence of legal and political environment in favour of 
implementing such taxes is another issue in need of further research, the present study 
tries to establish that migrant taxes can be beneficial in raising the level of human 
capital in the origin country—a subject not discussed in the existing literature. The 
procedure follows a traditional tax subsidy scheme that operates on a set of individuals 
maximizing their own discounted lifetime utility from choices towards human capital 
formation and migration. It turns out that the effect of migration taxes would be positive 
and most significant in raising the average level of human capital for the non-migrants if 
the unskilled migrants face a relatively higher tax burden on their income. This is 
particularly appealing for an economy where the pre-migration pre-tax level of human 
capital formation is low. A scheme of flat migration tax would nevertheless be effective 
in raising the skill level further for countries with high or medium levels of human 
capital. The proportionately (or actually) higher migration tax creates a disincentive for 
unskilled migrants to migrate as unskilled workers. At the same time, since the policy of 
the state is to redistribute the migration tax as educational subsidy, a larger number of 
unskilled workers find it rewarding to acquire human capital with or without future 
intentions of undertaking migration. If they do not migrate they earn the skilled wage at 
home, and if they do they end up paying a lower (or proportionally lower) tax than the 
unskilled. Thus, despite a seemingly inequitable proposition this offers a potential win-
win situation for a large number of unskilled non-migrants. 
 
A few extensions can enrich the results of this model. Wages, instead of being treated as 
exogenous, may respond to the mobility of workers. It is possible when migration is 
large and either or both the origin and the destination countries are small. The impact of 
migrant taxes needs to be re-evaluated in that case. Moreover, we did not consider any 
tax sharing arrangement between any two countries that may be bilaterally involved in 
implementing this policy and therefore the implications are restricted to local welfare. 
Once that is brought into account it is quite plausible that the implications for global   13
welfare would be considerable in addition to the fact that a lower restriction on the 
movements of skilled workers by itself is believed to be welfare enhancing in a global 
sense. The impact on local and global income distribution is another aspect that requires 
further attention in the related context. 
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Appendix I 
Freeman’s (1986: 375-76) summary of the various dimensions of the ‘demand for 
education’ and its reference to Mincer’s (1974) model for determination of the 
education-earnings relation is well known and is based on the following comparison: 
∫∫ ∫
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Where,  t W  is the unskilled wage,  St W  is the skilled wage,  St W′  is the wage the agent 
earns during the period over which human capital is acquired, D is the direct cost of 
education and ρ  is the discount rate. n and (n+s) are the number of years unskilled and 
skilled workers respectively work. If  D WSt = = ′ 0 , the above comparison between the 
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function and determines what factors would influence the supply of skilled labour most. 
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Equating (A1) and (A2) one determines the critical relative risk aversion among the 
mass of workers in the home country, in favour or against human capital formation. 
This is displayed in Panel A of Figure 1, where given the values of the parameters, we 
solve for  584 . 0 *= r . 
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r EU r EU S S . This equated with (A2) yields the critical risk relative 
risk aversion among the skilled workers—on the choice between migrating or staying   15
home,  92 . 0
* = S r , as displayed in Panel B of Figure 1. Also, it can be seen from this 
relationship that [ ) 1 , 0 ) ( ) (
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Equating that to equation (A1) yields,  683 . 0
* = U r  and shown in Panel C of Figure 1.  
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 with  S τ  and  U τ  as taxes imposed 
on the skilled and the unskilled migrants, respectively. Based on the tax revenue the 
government collects, a per unit subsidy of θ  is offered to the unskilled migrants in the 
origin country. This affects the level of  * r as obtained from the previous equality of 
(A1) and (A2). In other words, the new solution requires a comparison of the expected 
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However, as discussed earlier equation (6) generates a dynamic relationship between the 
provision of subsidy and the critical risk aversion, where, the RHS of equation (6) now 
yields:  [] ) 1 (
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Equating (A1) and (A5) we obtain the relation described as *) , ( r M θ : 
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. Substituting the parameter values as 






ρ , we obtain the relationship for 
*) , ( r M θ  as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Finally, the budget constraint facing the government is given by: 
U U S S U r r r r r r τ τ θ
* * * *) 1 ( * ) 1 ( *) 1 ( − + = − − , which generates the relationship described 
as *) , ( r B θ ,  
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, and the three possible cases discussed above (i.e. 
U S U S U S and τ τ τ τ τ τ < > = ; ; ) are shown in Figure 2. The interaction between (A6) 
and (A7) generates a new  * r  for different combinations of  U S and τ τ , demonstrating 
how skill specific migration taxes affect the critical relative risk aversion in a country 
and hence the level of human capital formation. 
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